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What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?
MICHAEL S. WOLLY*
Prior to January 1977, public employees who were disciplined by their
employers in whole or in part because they engaged in constitutionally
protected activities could rely on the federal courts to remedy their
employers' actions. Then the United States Supreme Court delivered its
opinion in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,'
which requires the courts to provide offending public employers a second
chance to justify their otherwise tainted employment decisions. This
Article will examine the Mt. Healthy decision and review the effect it and
its progeny have had on labor relations litigation in the three years since it
was rendered. In other words, what hath Mt. Healthy wrought?2
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF A
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
The notion that public employment is a privilege to which no rights
attach has long been discredited. It is now beyond question that public
employees enjoy the protection of the first amendment's guarantees.4 This
protection extends to both speech5 and association.6 The right is not
absolute, however, and the courts, recognizing the special circumstances of
the employment relationship, have permitted the public employer some
flexibility in limiting the exercise of the right.7
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1. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
2. In Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court also disposed of issues of jurisdiction and sovereign
immunity before treating the issues that form the basis for this Article. Beyond noting that the Court
held that Doyle satisfied the monetary requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 429 U.S. at 276-79,
and that the Mt. Healthy City Board of Education "is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of
the State . . . [and hence] not entitled to assert any Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the
federal courts." id. at 280-81, this Article will not treat those other issues.
3. Tinkerv. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969) ("It can
hardly be argued that . . . teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.").
4. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
5. Smith v. Highway Employees Local 1315, U.S. - , 99 S. Ct. 1826, 1828
(1979); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979); Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,284 (1977); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
574-75 (1968).
6. Smith v. Highway Employees Local 1315, U.S. , 99 S. Ct. 1826, 1828 (1979);
Elrod v. Burns. 427 U.S. 347,357 (1976); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1945); AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir.
1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1968).
7. See, e.g.. Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1970).
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The Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education" developed a
balancing test that has since become the standard by which it is determined
whether employee speech and related conduct is constitutionally
protected. When the employee's statements or conduct can be shown to
impede the performance of the duties of his job,9 to have disrupted
substantially the regular operation of the work place generally, to have
interfered unduly with the maintenance of "discipline by immediate
superiors or harmony among coworkers,"1 "to have violated the need for
confidentiality,"' 2  or when "the relationship between superior and
subordinate is of such a personal and intimate nature that certain forms of
public criticism of the superior by the subordinate would seriously
undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship .... ,1 then the
interest of the employer in limiting the employee's speech will be deemed
sufficient to outweigh the employee's interest in commenting on matters of
public concern.
14
The enjoyment of this protection is not limited to permanent (that
is, tenured) employees.' 5 An employee's "lack of a contractual or tenure
'right' to re-employment . . . is immaterial to his-free speech claim."' 6
The consequence of his tenure, in constitutional terms, is that he must be
afforded a due process hearing in connection with adverse employment
decisions, a right to which the nontenured employee is not entitled.'
7
Prior to Mt. Healthy, the federal courts regularly granted relief to
employees who showed that their employment was terminated wholly or in
part because they exercised a constitutional right.'
II. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education
v. Doyle
This, then, was the state of the law during Fred Doyle's employment
as an untenured teacher in Mt. Healthy, Ohio. Doyle's teaching career was
no different than most others until 1969, when he was elected president of
8. 391 U.S. 563, 569-570 (1968).
9. See id. at 572-73.
10. See id. at 573.
11. See id. at 570.
12. See id. at 570 n.3.
13. See id. See also Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1292 (D. Del. 1977).
14. Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1291 (D. Del. 1977).
15. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972).
16. Id. at 597-98. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960).
17. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
18. Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803,806 (9th Cir. 1975); Skehanv.
Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 39 (3d Cir. 1974), remanded for further consideration on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975), rehearing en banc on other grounds, 538 F.2d 53, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
979 (1976); Langford v. City of Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262, 266-68 (8th Cir. 1973); Gieringer v. Center
School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164, 1166 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Simard v.
Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1973); CollegeTeachers Union Local 1600 v. Byrd, 456 F.2d
882, 888 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 441
F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 1971).
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the Teachers Association. He served as president for one year and then
served on the Association's executive committee for another year.
19
During this period, the Association and the Board of Education negotiated
directly on various topics relating to the teachers' working conditions.2 °
In February 1971, the principal of the school at which Doyle worked
circulated a memorandum to a number of teachers, including Doyle,
concerning teacher dress and appearance. At the time, various bond issues
were up for referenda and some school administrators apparently believed
there was a relationship between teacher appearance and public support
for these bond issues. Doyle understood that the teachers' dress issue was
to be settled by joint teacher-administration action.21 Viewing the
memorandum as a breach of this understanding, Doyle revealed the
substance of the memorandum to a local disc jockey whose radio station
promptly put the news of the adoption of the dress code on the air.22 The
principal felt that the station acted at Doyle's behest and "called him on the
carpet for it."'23 Doyle conceded that he should have first communicated
any criticism he had to the school administration, and apologized to the
principal for this oversight.24
Nevertheless, the next month, when contract recommendations for
rehiring nontenured teachers were made, the superintendent recommend-
ed that Doyle not be rehired. The board adopted the superintendent's
recommendation. 25 The decision of the board amounted to more than a
dismissal. Had the contract been extended, Doyle's status would have
changed from a nontenured to a tenured teacher.26
Following a request from Doyle for a written statement explaining the
basis for the board's action, the board advised Doyle that he had shown "a
notable lack of tact in handling professional matters which [left] much
doubt as to [his] sincerity in establishing good school relationships. 27 The
board proceeded to describe two incidents upon which it relied: (1) the
radio station incident, which the board said "raised much concern not only
,,28
within this community, but also in neighboring communities, and (2) an
19. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281 (1977).
20. Interview with John C. Burkholder, Attorney, Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker,
LP.A.. Columbus, Ohio (March 28, 1980). Mr. Burkholder was counsel for the Mt. Healthy school
district at the trial court level.
21. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977).
22. Id.
23. Petition for Certiorari, App. at 9a, Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No.
74-8044 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 9, 1974).
24. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 286.
27. Id. at 282.
28. "You assumed the responsibility to notify W.S.A.I. Radio Station in regards to the
suggestion of the Board that teachers establish an appropriate dress code for professional people. This
raised much concern not only within this community, but also in neighboring communities." Mt.
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 283 n.1.
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earlier incident involving Doyle's use of obscene gestures in the school
cafeteria to two girls who failed to obey a directive he issued as cafeteria
supervisor.29
Doyle brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio seeking reinstatement with tenure and back
pay.30 The district court found "the conversation with the radio station
clearly protected by the First Amendment," and that this conversation
"played a substantial part in the decision not to renew" Doyle's contract.3'
Thus, "even in the face of other permissible grounds," the district court
concluded that the board's decision, tainted by a nonpermissible reason,
could not stand.32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, in
a brief order, concluding that substantial evidence in the record supported
the district court's finding that the school board's action "was motivated at
least in part" by Doyle's contacting the radio station about the dress code,
"a constitutionally impermissible reason" to refuse to renew his contract.33
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously. Although it agreed with
the lower courts that Doyle's communication to the radio station was
constitutionally protected, the Court found fault with the reasoning
behind the lower courts' conclusion that Doyle was therefore entitled to
reinstatement with back pay.34 The Court first reiterated its established
principle that Doyle's lack of tenure did not defeat his cause.35 The Court
29. "You used obscene gestures to correct students in a situation in the cafeteria causing
considerable concern among those students present." Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. at 283 n.l. See also id. at 282. Following a heated verbal dispute with the students,
Doyle gave the girls a two-fingered gesture which the district court explained to mean "bull
Petition for Certiorari, App. at 8a-9a, Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-
8044 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 1974). The girls responded with a one-finger gesture meaning"screw you." Id.
Doyle admitted to the assistant principal that he had overreacted and the matter was ultimately
straightened out by an apology and explanation from Doyle to the students. Id. at 8a.
30. At trial, several other incidents were described by representatives of the school board as
evidencing Doyle's "lack of tact." On one occasion, he refused to accept an apology from a teacherwho
had slapped him during an argument in settlement of the matter, a refusal that ultimately escalated into
suspensions for both teachers and a teacher walk-out in protest. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at283 n. I at 281. However, the school board laterlifted both suspensions with
no prejudice to either teacher's record. Petition for Certiorari, App. at 6a, Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-8044 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 1974). Other instances included an
argument with cafeteria personnel over the amount of spaghetti he had been served and a referral to
certain students as "sons of bitches" in connection with a disciplinary complaint. Mt. Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 281-82.
31. Petition for Certiorari, App. at 12a-13a, Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., No. 74-8044 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 1974).
32. Id. The court awarded Doyle reinstatement with tenure, back pay, attorney's fees and costs.
Id. at 13a-14a.
33. Petition for Certiorari, App. at 18a-19a, Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., No. 75-1382 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1975). The court of appeals vacated the award of attorney's fees
based on the intervening decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975). Petition for Certiorari, App. at 19aDoyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No.
75-1382 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1975).
34. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977).
35. Id. at 283.
Even though he could have been discharged for no reason whatever, and had no
constitutional right to a hearing prior to the decision not to rehire him, Board of Regents v.
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then proceeded to balance Doyle's speech with the interests of the school
district in accordance with Pickering to determine whether that speech was
constitutionally protected. Finding no suggestion "that Doyle violated any
established policy, or that [the board's] reaction to his communication to
the radio station was anything more than an ad hoc response to Doyle's
action in making the memorandum public," the Court accepted the district
court's finding that Doyle's conduct was indeed protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments.36
This analysis brought the Court to the question of the effect of the
school district's response and to the issue of the relief to be granted in the
circumstances. Here the Court parted with the district court's conclusion
that because a nonpermissible reason played a substantial part in the
decision not to renew, the employer's decision was necessarily to be
stricken. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist framed the issue thus:
"[W]hether even if [the school board would have dismissed Doyle had the
constitutionally protected incident not occurred], the fact that the
protected conduct played a 'substantial part' in the actual decision not to
renew-would necessarily amount to a constitutional violation justifying
remedial action.""
The Court was explicitly concerned with the unjust reward the district
court's conclusion would reap for an otherwise undeserving employee. The
limited focus of the district court's analysis, the Supreme Court
conjectured, "could place an employee in a better position as a result of the
exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have
occupied had he done nothing. '38 The Justices were particularly troubled
by the possibility that a "borderline or marginal candidate" would be able,
by engaging in protected activity, "to prevent his employer from assessing
his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of
that record. 39 The Court saw this possibility as real if reinstatement was
required "in cases where a dramatic and perhaps abrasive incident is
inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the decision to rehire, and
does indeed play a part in that decision-even if the same decision would
have been reached had the incident not occurred." 40
Therefore, the Court determined that before relief in the form of
reversing the employer's decision is granted, an inquiry into the validity of
other alleged bases for the employer's decision, and the weight they would
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), he may nonetheless establish a claim to reinstatement if the
decision not to rehire him was made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected
First Amendment freedoms. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 283-84.
36. Id. at 284.
37. Id. at 285.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 286.
40. Id. at 285. The Court was especially impressed by the undesirability of such an occurrence
when the decision in question affects tenure, "[tlhe long-term consequences of [which] are of great
moment both to the employee.and to the employer." Id. at 286.
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have been accorded by the employer had the protected activity never aris-
en, is necessary. The Court reasoned that if the inquiry establishes that the
decision would have been the same absent the impermissible considera-
tion, then allowing the decision to stand would place the employee "in no
worse position than if he had not engaged in the conduct. ' 41 By this result,
"[t]he constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated" 42 because
the employee's injury (that is, loss of his job) cannot be said to have been
caused by a constitutional violation.43 Likening the evaluation of employer
motivation to that of voluntariness in criminal confessions, the Court
decided that the aforementioned inquiry should protect "against the
invasion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable
consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights.""
The Court concluded its opinion by summarizing the shifting burdens
that henceforth would apply in determining whether proven constitutional
violations have caused results justifying remedial action. Initially, the
burden is on the plaintiff "to show that his conduct was constitutionally
protected, and that this conduct was a 'substantial factor'-or, to put it in
other words, that it was a 'motivating factor' " in the decision being
challenged.45 In the face of this proof, the defendant can preclude remedial
action for the consequences of the decision if it can show "by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same
decision .. .even in the absence of the protected conduct."46 Because the
decisions of the lower courts did not reveal what conclusion would have
been reached had this test been applied,47 the case was remanded for
further proceedings.
III. THE THRUST OF Mt. Healthy
In Mt. Healthy the Court was concerned primarily with the
consequences of the defendant's conduct and the scope of relief available
to the plaintiff to remedy those consequences. 48 Thus, it held that "[t]he
41. Id. at 285-86.
42. Id. at 285.
43. Id. at 286-87. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
44. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
45. Id. The Court cited Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270-71 (1977) in support of its "motivating factor" language. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287 n.2.
46. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287.
47. The district court indicated only that "there did exist in fact reason .. . independentofany
First Amendment rights or exercise thereof, to not extend tenure." Petition for Certiorari, App. at 12a-
13a, Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-8044 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 1974). While
this reason could have caused the school board to dismiss Doyle even absent consideration of his
protected activity, there was no finding whether it would actually have done so.
48. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 579 F.2d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 1978) (Mt. Healthy stands
for "the settled principle that the perpetrator of a constitutional wrong bears the burden of
demonstrating that its violation had no effect, or a limited effect, on what actually happened.");
Weissbaum v. Hannon, 439 F. Supp. 873, 879 n.7 (N.D. Il1. 1977) ("[T]he defendants can limit the
[Vol. 41:385
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constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an
employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the
conduct. ' 49 It was the relief awarded by the district court, reinstatement,
that the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy saw as "the undesirable con-
sequences not necessary to the assurance of [the constitutional] rights."5 °
The burden Mt. Healthy places on the employer is not directed at the
prima facie case itself. Plainly, if he can prove his decision was totally
untainted, he does not need Mt. Healthy to prevail.5' But, if he is unable to
undo the finding that unconstitutional considerations entered into the
challenged decision, he now has a second chance to escape liability. 52 Mt.
Healthy allows him to convince the court that the plaintiff should take
nothing because the circumstances were such that the plaintiff would have
suffered the loss anyway. The burden on the employer, if he cannot refute
the prima facie case, is to prove that even the prima facie case does not state
a claim upon which relief should be granted.
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District" confirmed
this relief-oriented purpose of Mt. Healthy. Bessie Givhan was a school
teacher who was dismissed after she criticized the school district's policies
in private conversations with her school principal. Justice Rehnquist,
again writing for a unanimous Court, determined that Givhan's criticisms,
despite their private nature, were constitutionally protected. "Neither the
[First] Amendment itself nor our decisions 54 indicate that this freedom is
lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with
his employer rather than to spread his views before the public."'55 Because
Givhan was tried before Mt. Healthy was decided, however, the Court
remanded on the question whether Mrs. Givhan "would have been rehired
but for her criticism. 56
Justice Rehnquist's description of Mt. Healthy in remanding Givhan
plaintiffs remedy by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have reached the
same decision ...."). See Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1303 (D. Del. 1977)
("The existence of a collateraljustification for defendants' actions possibly may be relevant to the scope
of relief afforded to [the plaintiff], particularly regarding the appropriateness of reinstatement as a
remedy."); Johnson v. Butler, 433 F. Supp. 53 1, 535 (W.D. Va. 1977) ("The teacher would be entitled to
relief, however, only if the School Board were unable to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision ...."); See also Board of Trustees of Weston County School
Dist. No. I v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, 1018 (Wyo. 1978).
49. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977).
50. Id. at 287.
51. See, e.g., Rocker v. Huntington, 550 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1977).
52. Morris v. City of Kokomo, - Ind. App . . 381 N.E.2d 510,517 (1978).
53. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
54. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Perry v.
Sindermann. 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
55. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410,415-16 (1979) (footnote added).
The Court found that the private nature of the expression might necessitate different considerations in
striking the Pickering balance: "When a government employee generally confronts his immediate
superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of
the employee's message, but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered." Id. at 415 n.4.
56. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979).
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stressed the relief-related considerations underlying the former opinion.
Thus, he wrote that in Mt. Healthy the Court "rejected the view that a
public employee must be reinstated whenever constitutionally protected
conduct plays a 'substantial' part in the employer's decision to
terminate. '  His concern was clearly with inequitably placing the
employee in a better position merely because a part of the employer's
motive was wrong. His decision was not so much intended to deny the
significance of the unconstitutional motivation as it was to investigate its
actual effect and to ensure that the employer's right to weed out the
unsatisfactory employee is not eroded. Thus, the unconstitutional act
being established, the remand in Givhan allowed the school district an
opportunity to convince the district court that because the school district
would not have rehired her in any event, Mrs. Givhan should not be
reinstated.58
Too many courts have relied upon the causation test to evaluate the
constitutional merits of the employer's decision.59 It is the injury, not the
violation itself, at which the causation test is directed. The plaintiff's
satisfaction of his burden establishes the constitutional violation. 60 The
57. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
58. The Court even went to the extreme of suggesting valid bases upon which the school district
could rely before the district court, bases that "would hardly strike [the court] as surprising." Givhan v.
Wester Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. at 417 n.5. Justice Stevens, concurring, agreed with the
court of appeals that the district court's finding that Givhan's protected activity was the "primary"
reason for the school district's decision and "almost entirely responsible for her termination,"
foreclosed a Mt. Healthy claim. Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring). He nevertheless agreed with the
majority that the district court should decide whether the issue required further proceedings or could be
decided on the existing record. Id. at 418 (Stevens, J. concurring).
59. See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470, 480 (3d Cir. 1978):
To the extent the Mt. Healthy Court adopted a"new" formulation of the test of causation for
claims alleging dismissal from public employment for reasons violative of the first
amendment, the"new" aspect of that formulation was the Court's holding that the defendants
in such a case must be afforded an opportunity to rebut a prima facie case of impermissible
motivation by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have reached the
same decision even in the absence of the constitutionally protected conduct of plaintiff.
Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 64 (2d Cir. 1978):
[Tihe Supreme Court has categorically stated that, despite the fact that the defendant
governmental officials may have acted, in part, for reasons that do not comport with the
requirements of the United States Constitution, the plaintiff's claim that his constitutional
rights have been abridged cannot be sustained if the defendant governmental officials
demonstrate that they "would have reached the same decision . . . even in the absence of
[their reliance upon constitutionally impermissible factors.f'
Love v. Sessions, 568 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[l]f the Board's charges of insubordination and
violation of rules are both true and a sufficient basis for the nonrenewal of[plaintiff's] contract, such
that the same decision would have been made in the absence of constitutionally protected expression,
the Board would have established a complete defense."); Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d 1188,1191 (10th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978) ("[Pier se violations do not result from a'consideration' of
protected conduct .... "); Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v.
Day, 553 F.2d 1160, 1162-63 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Justice Rehnquist . . . took issue with the proposition
that a constitutional violation occurs whenever a teacher's protected conduct plays a 'substantial part'
in a school board's non-renewal decision."); Citron v. Jackson State Univ., 456 F. Supp. 3, 16 (S.D.
Miss. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he non-renewal [ofa teacher's contract] would not
amount to a constitutional violation if the Board, in fact, would have reached the same decision in any
event.").
60. Carmichael v. Chambers County Bd. of Educ., 581 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1978); Hastings v.
Bonner, 578 F.2d 136, 141 (5th Cir. 1978).
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causation test is only to determine whether the proven violation "justif[ies]
remedial action."' t The rule that consideration of constitutionally
protected activity in the disciplinary decisionmaking process is offensive to
the Constitution survived Mt. Healthy intact.
6 2
One of the difficulties with the Mt. Healthy decision from the
plaintiff's standpoint is how to refute the employer's assertion that the
same decision would have been made regardless of the protected activity. If
the employer has merely seized upon an allegedly legitimate excuse to
punish the employee unlawfully, then a pretext case will have been made
that eliminates the need to shift the burden to the employer. If the
employer's purported reason is pretextual, then the impermissible reason
will constitute the sole cause of discipline. But if the employer is able to
survive a pretext argument, he obviously holds the advantage in resisting a
judgment reversing his decision.
In the public sector at least, management officials are presumed to act
in good faith with honest motives.63 When this presumption is combined
with the likelihood that crucial testimony will come from the individual
who made the original tainted decision and "who is, correspondingly,
more likely than someone else to want to vindicate" that decision-, 64 the
plaintiff who cannot prove pretext will be hard-pressed to convince a court
that other permissible grounds for the employer's action would not have
been used to the same end.65
Should the case reach the stage where a "but for" defense is
forthcoming, the plaintiff can rely on the unequivocal requirement that the
employer show not only that he could have, but that he would have, done
the same thing even absent the protected conduct. 66 The existence of valid
61. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977). Cf. Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21 (1977) (If the village
establishes "that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been
considered . . . .the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury
complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose.") See also East Texas Motor
Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-04 n.9 (1977).
62. Hastings v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136, 141 (5th Cir. 1978).
63. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n., 426 U.S. 482,497 (1976).
Cf Texas Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 1067, 1073 (lst Cir. 1979) ("[T]hefactfinderis bound to
weigh the employer's asserted justification with some delicacy and deference."); Meyr v. Board of
Educ.. 572 F.2d 1229, 1233 (8th Cir. 1978):
School boards and other public boards are as a matter of public knowledge frequently
subjected to public criticism for making or failing to make appropriations . . . or . . . to
grant salary increases. The statement made by the plaintiff is not the kind of statement that
could be reasonably supposed to upset the school board officials.
Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978):
There must be made a beginning assumption that [school officials] were acting in good faith
and aware of the constitutional problems. In this day and age, [they] are probably exposed
more than any othergroup to constitutional claims, issues, and arguments in their day-to-day
duties. These matters have thus become a part of their regular problem-solving functions.
64. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Properly" Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 450 n.13 (1977).
65. See, e.g.. Foreman v. Vermilion Parish School Bd., 353 So. 2d 471,473 (La. App. 1977), cert.
denied, 355 So. 2d 257 (La. 1978).
66. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410,416-17(1979); Mt. Healthy City
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reasons to support the employer's decision is not enough-proving "that
the same decision would have been justified . . . is not the same as
proving that the same decision would have been made., 67 Mt. Healthy is
clear that specific proof must be directed to this point; the reviewing court
should not base its evaluation of the employer's defense on mere
speculation.68
IV. THE NEED FOR SOME RELIEF
The answer to the question of what an employer would have done
does not alter what it did do. Rather, it responds to the problem of what
should be done as a result. The "but for" test is oriented toward the
ultimate result of the employer's action. In this vein, some relief, even if
only nominal, should be granted so that the employer who escapes having
to reinstate the employee is nevertheless put on notice that the decision-
making process he followed was improper. Even if the employer carries his
burden precluding an order of reinstatement or back pay or both, the
constitutional violation is proven once it has been shown that the protected
activity was a substantial factor in the employer's disciplinary decision.
The employee should still be permitted to offer proof of actual injury
flowing from that impermissible consideration. The injury might take the
form of emotional distress, embarrassment or humiliation, which are all
compensable under section 1983.69 While proof of such injury is not a
simple task, it is by no means inconceivable that evidence of mental or
emotional distress can be produced to support a substantial damage award
in those circumstances. 70 The employee who loses his job for justifiable
job-related reasons he can understand, should be less emotionally affected
by the dismissal than the employee who knows that his engaging in
constitutionally protected conduct contributed substantially to the
decision to fire him. This latter employee will find little consolation in his
employer's subsequent rationalization that although the dismissal was
substantially motivated to retaliate for the protected activity, he would
have been fired anyway. The message behind the partial retaliatory motive
will not be lost in the judicial shuffle. The employee should be compen-
sated for the psychological effects of his employer's openly impermissible
considerations.
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46,66 n.21 (2d Cir.
1978); Carr v. Board ofTrustees, 465 F. Supp. 886,902 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Cf. Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v.
County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (E.D. Va. 1979) (The court frames the issue in terms of
whether permissible factors could have been considered). But see Garza v. Rodriguez, 559 F.2d 259.
261 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 877 (1978).
67. Ayers v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1315 (5th Cir. 1977), vac. on
other grounds sub. nom., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
68. Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (denial of absolute right of procedural due
process).
69. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,263-64 (1978); Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp.
1273, 1309-10 (D. Del. 1977), and cases cited therein. See also Endress v. Brookdale Community
College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 142, 364 A.2d 1080, 1097 (1976).
70. See generally Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-264 (1978).
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This approach is wholly consistent with that applied by the Supreme
Court in the face of proof of unconstitutional procedural defects in public
employment decisions.71 In Mt. Healthy and Givhan the Court has devised
a similar "harmless error" test for substantive constitutional rights.72
Certainly these rights under the first amendment are no less fundamental
than those under the fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments. Violation
of these rights, even if ultimately resulting in no egregious injury, should be
accorded equal treatment.
This, it would seem, is the better accommodation that Mt. Healthy
addresses. Otherwise, the employer may well become cavalier toward his
constitutional obligation, announcing without reluctance his partial
improper motivation.
The chilling effect of an employer's ultimate victory, despite the
finding of a constitutional violation, will not be lost on other employees.
No compelling interest can be shown to so tilt the balance against free
73
speech and other protected activities. Some relief is necessary to ensure
that the constitutional violation is not trivialized to the point of
irrelevancy. 74
This section has considered the impact of Mt. Healthy on cases
concerning employer violations of employee constitutional rights. The
consequences of the case have not been thus limited. The effect of Mt.
Healthy also extends to cases concerning employer violations of statutory
rights.
V. Mt. Healthy AND THE NLRB
The effects of Mt. Healthy have been felt especially at the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board). Nearly two-thirds of all
unfair labor practice charges filed with the NLRB allege employer action in
violation of section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
71. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
72. Doyle v. United States, 599 F.2d 984, 995 (Ct. Cl. 1979). See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
260 (1978); Codd v. Velger 429 U.S. 624, 630 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320-21 n.54 (1978) (Powell,
J.).
74. See McGill v. Board of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 1979). The desirability of
preserving some relief in these cases, even if only in injunctive form to prevent unconstitutional
considerations from entering into governmental decision-making, is heightened when one realizes that
the Mt. Healthy test has been applied to constitutional questions across the board. See, e.g., Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1979) Oury selection); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st
Cir. 1979) (age discrimination); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (Ist Cir. 1979) (sex discrimination);
Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1385-87 (5th Cir. 1979) (retaliation for initiating civil litigation);
Buise v. Hudkins. 584 F.2d 223, 229-33 (7th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979) (prison
transfers); Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1978) (apartment lease
terminations); Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1318-19 (E.D. Va.
1979) (rejection of low-to-moderate income housing plans); Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332, 337
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (handicap discrimination); Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium, 469 F. Supp. 690,
692 (D. Mass. 1979) (retaliation for filing charges with government agencies); Lamb v. Hutto, 467 F.
Supp. 562, 564-65 (E.D. Va. 1979) (prison transfers); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm.,
454 F. Supp. 703. 712 (D. Mass. 1978) (removal of books from school libraries); Arnold v. Ballard, 448
F. Supp. 1025, 1031-32 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices);
Taylor v. Franklin Drapery Co., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 279, 298 (W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated, 443 F. Supp.
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the Act),75 which forbids employer encouragement or discouragement of
union membership by discrimination in hiring, firing, or any term or
condition of employment.76 In administering this provision of the Act, the
NLRB has consistently maintained that, in cases in which the employer's
intent is a relevant consideration, 77 employer encouragement or dis-
couragement of unionism that is motivated in anypart by a discriminatory
intent is an 8(a)(3) violation.78
The Board's "partial motive" standard for 8(a)(3) analysis has
generally been accepted by the circuit courts of appeals. 9 The First
Circuit, however, has rejected the Board's view and has adopted a
"dominant motive" test.80 In a "mixed motive" case-when the employer's
encouragement or discouragement of unionism is motivated both by an
anti-union animus and a legitimate business justification-the First
Circuit standard requires not only a showing of discriminatory employer
intent, but also a showing that such intent was the dominant factor in the
795 (1978) (retaliation for filing charges with government agencies); Dilley v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp.
375, 378-79 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd, 603 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (military selection-out procedure);
Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 966 (D. Md. 1977) (racially discriminatory hiring
and promotion practices); Whitehead v. Alexander, 439 F. Supp. 910, 912 (D.D.C. 1977) (military
selection-out procedures); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 260 (S.D. Ohio 1977),
aff'd, in part and rev'dandremanded in part, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), applicationforstay granted,
439 U.S. 1348 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.), aff'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (school desegregation); Grayson v.
Christian, 64 A.D.2d 887, 888, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 896, 897 (1978) (apartment lease terminations).
75. 42 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 11 (1977).
76. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(1977).
77. Subjective discriminatory intent in fact is not necessarily an element of an 8(a)(3) violation.
When the employer's action does not, on its face, clearly encourage or discourage unionism, then a
showing of subjective discriminatory intent on the employer's part is necessary to make out an 8(a)(3)
violation. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,42-44 (1954); NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937).
When, however, the employer's action clearly encourages or discourages unionism, discriminatory
intent is presumed. If the impact on unionism is "comparatively slight," the employer may rebut the
presumption of discriminatory intent by showing a legitimate business justification for its actions. See
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 228 (1963). Once the presumption has been rebutted, an 8(a)(3) violation can exist only upon an
additional showing of subjective discriminatory intent in fact. If, however, the impact of the employer's
action is "inherently destructive" of employee rights protected by the NLRA, then the presumption of
discriminatory intent is considered conclusive and the NLRB can find an 8(a)(3) violation, without
regard to an employer's assertion of a legitimate business justification. See NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 33-34. See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 228.
78. See, e.g., Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1978); NLRBv.
Gogin, 575 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1978); Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1977).
79. See cases cited in note 78 supra. See also NLRB v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 423 F.2d 878
(5th Cir. 1970); Betts Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. West Side Carpet
Cleaning Co., 329 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Great E. Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352
(2d Cir. 1962).
80. See NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 669-72 (1st Cir. 1979);
Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90,97-99 (2d Cir. 1978); Coletti's Furniture,
Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292, 1293 (1st Cir. 1977); DuRoss, Toward Rationality1 in Discriminatory
Discharge Cases: The Impact ofMt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle upon the NLRB, 66 GEO. L.
J. 1109, 1110-12 (1978).
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employer's motivation. 8' Conversely, the Board would find an 8(a)(3)
violation in such a case if the employer was even partially motivated by an
anti-union intent.
8 2
The First Circuit, and others critical of the NLRB's partial motive
standard, find support for their dominant motive test of 8(a)(3) violations
in mixed motive cases in the Supreme Court's holding in Mt. Healthy. 3
These advocates of the dominant motive test have sought to use Mt.
Healthy as a death knell for the partial motive standard employed by the
Board.
The critics of the Board would enact a wholesale transfer of a
constitutional scheme, which is judicially regulated, to a labor relations
scheme, which Congress intended to be regulated administratively.
Plainly, there is no valid reason to believe that the Board's administration
of the Act has been so deficient that it renders the balance struck by
Congress imperfect. The multitude of charges brought against employers
under section 8(a)(3) of the Act exposes as unfounded any fear that the
partial motive standard "induc[es] employers to tread especially lightly
when a union activist is involved-thereby violating the Act by
encouraging pro-union activity.
84
The better view is that expressed by Circuit Judge Thornberry,
concurring in Federal-Mogul Corporation v. N.L R.B."5 Fully recognizing
that the balancing of competing interests is essential in both the
constitutional and labor arenas, Judge Thornberry properly distinguishes
the responsibility of the courts in the former from that of the Congress in
the latter. In enacting federal labor law, "Congress has already established
a balance .. . [that] favors the employee, for Congress clearly recogniz-
ed the superior bargaining position of the employer. The'but for' standard
significantly restrikes this balance in favor of the employer, and such a test
is contrary to Congressional policy . ,,. 6 Until congressional intent to
the contrary is expressed, the Board's partial motive standard should be
retained.87
Moreover, the Board's critics fail to recognize that Mt. Healthy
81. Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Ist Cir. 1977). See also NLRB v.
Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1312 (Ist Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publishing Co., 320 F.2d
835, 842 (1 st Cir. 1963) (Aldrich, J., concurring); NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883,885-
86 (lst Cir. 1953).
82. See cases cited in notes 78 and 79 supra.
83. See NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 669-72; Coletti's Furniture,
Inc. v. NLRB. 550 F.2d at 1293; Duross, supra note 80, at 1112-26.
84. Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 99 (2nd Cir. 1978).
85. 566 F.2d 1245, 1265 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry, J., concurring).
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Even if the Board were to adopt Mt. Healthy standard, it should reject the dominant motive
test advocated by the First Circuit. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1311-12 and
n.I (1st Cir. 1971) for an example of this standard. Plainly, "substantial" or "motivating" is not
synonymous with "dominate." The Mt. Healthy rule does not require plaintiff to show that the
impermissible element in the employer's decision was the dominant reason, only that it played a
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addresses remedies for violations,. not violations themselves. Unlike
findings of fact, which are reviewed under the "substantial evidence" rule,8"
remedies are to be fashioned by the Board within its broad range of
discretion.89 Nevertheless, the reviewing courts in NLRB cases have been
convinced that the "but for" standard enunciated in Mt. Healthy is a test
for determining the violation rather than the relief. Thus, despite the
Supreme Court's failure to require more of a plaintiff to prevail than a
showing that the impermissible consideration was a "substantial" or
"motivating" factor to establish a constitutional violation, the courts,
relying on Mt. Healthy in reviewing the Board's determinations, have
improperly required more to establish an 8(a)(3) violation.90
If used at all in 8(a)(3) cases, the "but for" test should be limited to
examining the proper remedy to impose consistent with section 10(c) of the
Act.9' The intent of the Act is to remove pro- or anti-union considerations
from employer disciplinary decisions. Proof that an employer considers
pro- or anti-union activity in assessing discipline sufficiently establishes a
violation of the Act. By considering protected activity in making
employment decisions, an employer commits a per se violation of the Act.
That valid justification would have resulted in discipline absent the
protected activity does not negate the violation, it merely mitigates the
need for the affirmative relief that would be required had no permissible
reason also existed. A cease-and-desist order should still issue to halt the
employer's practice of allowing impermissible considerations to enter into
his disciplinary decisions. The Board, as well as the reviewing courts,
should not ignore their responsibility to ensure this protection of the Act is
maintained. This is the rationality that the Act demands in discriminatory
discharge cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to explain the changes in labor litigation
that have resulted from the Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy.
substantial part. Carmichael v. Chambers County Bd. of Educ., 58! F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); Morris v. City of Kokomo, -Ind. App. .. _ 381 N.E.2d 510,517(1978). But
see Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978)
("paramount"); Tanner v. McCall, 441 F. Supp. 503, 513 (M.D. Fla. 1977) ("primary and dominant").
88. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-78, 490-93 (1951).
89. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969); Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216-217 (1964).
90. See, e.g., Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1977).
91. Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(c) (1977), provides in
relevant part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any
person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue . . . an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of [the Act] . . . . No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any
individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of
any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
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Plaintiff's lawyers who formerly were content to try discharge cases on a
mixed motive theory find they now must engage in more extensive
preparation to undercut every other alternative excuse for the employer's
action. Defendant's lawyers find their clients avoiding financial liability
despite their unconstitutional acts. Pressure on the NLRB to abandon its
partial motive standard in discriminatory discharge cases has increased
considerably. The fact that constitutional and statutory violations have
occurred has been frequently lost in the shuffle. I hope the courts will pause
to scrutinize Mt. Healthy more closely and then devise relief that does not
command the "undesirable consequences" that the Supreme Court deems
unnecessary to the assurance of constitutional rights.92
92. Mi. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).

